Introduction
Almost a year after World War II ended, Congress established the United States Atomic Energy Commission to foster and control the peacetime development of atomic science and technology. Reflecting America's postwar optimism, Congress declared that atomic energy should be employed not only in the Nation's defense, but also to promote world peace, improve the public welfare, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise. After long months of intensive debate among politicians, military planners and atomic scientists, President Harry S. Truman confirmed the civilian control of atomic energy by signing the Atomic Energy Act on August 1,1946.(l) The provisions of the new Act bore the imprint of the American plan for international control presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission two months earlier by U.S. Representative Bernard Baruch. Although the Baruch proposal for a multinational corporation to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy failed to win the necessary Soviet support, the concept of combining development, production, and control in one agency found acceptance in the domestic legi,slation creating the United States Atomic Energy Commission. (2) Congress gave the new civilian Commission extraordinary power and independence to carry out its awesome responsibilities.
Five Commissioners appointed by the President would exercise authority for the operation of the Commission, while a general manager, also appointed by the President, would serve as chief executive officer. To provide the Commission exceptional freedom in hiring scientists and professionals, Commission employees would be exempt from the Civil Service system. Because of the need for great security, all production facilities and nuclear reactors would be government-owned, while all technical information and research results would be under Commission control, and thereby excluded from the normal application of the patent system.
In addition, the Act provided for three major advisory committees: a Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a Military Liaison Committee, and a General Advisory Committee of outstanding scientists.f3)
The First Commission
On January 1, 1947, the fledgling Atomic Energy Commission took over from the Manhattan Engineer District the massive research and production facilities built during World War II to develop the atomic bomb. The facilities were the product of an extraordinary mission accomplished in three years in almost complete secrecy. Under the direction of General Leslie Ft. Groves of the Army Corps of Engineers, the laboratory experiments of Enrico Fermi and other American and European scientists had been transformed into operating plants capable of producing a military weapon of devastating power. When the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and three days later on Nagasaki, not only was a long and costly war brought to an end, but the world also became aware of a completely new and largely unexpected technology. (4) As the first chairman of the agency created to control the peace,time development of the new technology, President Harry Truman appointed David E. Lilienthal, a lawyer and former head of tht Tennessee Valley Authority.
During the preceding year, Lilienthal and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson had co-authored the well-known Acheson-Lilienthal report which had formed the basis for the American plan for international control of atomic energy. Serving with Lilienthal on the Commission were Sumner T. Pike, a businessman from New England, William T. Waymack, a farmer and newspaper editor from Iowa, Lewis L. Strauss, a conservative banker and reserve admiral, and Robert F. Bather, a physicist from Los Alamos and the only scientist on the Commission. Carroll L. Wilson, a young engineer who had helped Vannevar Bush organize the National Defense Research Committee during the war, was appointed general manager. Two floors of the New War Department Building in Washington provided a temporary home for the Commission. A few months later more permanent headquarters were found at 19th and Constitution Avenue, N.W., in the former wartime offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The new Commission faced a challenging future. World War II was quickly followed by an uneasy international situation commonly referred to as the Cold War, and Lilienthal and his colleagues soon found that most of the Commission's resources had to be devoted to weapon development and production.
The requirements of national defense thus quickly obscured their original goal of developing the full potential of the peaceful atom. For two decades military-related programs would command the lion's share of the Commission's time and the major portion of the budget.t5)
The Nuclear Arsenal
To meet the Nations expanding requirements for fissionable material the Commission set about refurbishing the production and research facilities built during the war. A major overhaul of the original reactors and two new plutonium reactors were authorized for the Hanford, Washington plant. Oak Ridge was scheduled for an addition to the existing K-25 plant and a third gaseous diffusion plant for the production of uranium 235. The Commission decided to adopt the Army's practice of hiring private corporations to operate plants and laboratories, thereby extending into peacetime the contractor system previously used by the Government only in times of national emergency. Sandstone explored weapon designs and tested a new fission weapon to replace the clumsy tailor-made models used during World War II. By 1946 the Commission had both gun-type and implosion-type non-nuclear and nuclear components in stockpile and was well on the way toward producing an arsenal of nuclear weapons.
In early September 1949 a special Air Force unit detected a large radioactive mass over the Pacific, indicating that the Soviet Union had successfully detonated a nuclear device. The Soviet detonation not only ended the United States' monoploy of nuclear weapons, but also had an immediate effect on the Commission's planned expansion program. During the prolonged debate which followed the announcement of the Soviet event, Commissioner Lewis L. Strauss, supported by fellow Commissioner Gordon Dean, urged the Commission to take a "quantum jump" by developing a thermonuclear weapon. Strong support for the Strauss' position came from the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and from scientists such as Edward Teller, Luis W. Alverez, and Ernest 0. Lawrence, who agreed that the development of the superbomb was absolutely essential to the security of the United States. The members of the General Advisory Committee, however, while concurring in the need for giving high priority to the development of atomic weapons for tactical purposes, recommended against an all-out effort to develop a hydrogen bomb. On January 31,1950, President Truman settled the issue with his momentous decision that the Commission should expedite work on the thermonuclear weapon.(b)
Production Expansion
David Lilienthal resigned on February 15th after three years as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Although his dream of developing the full potential of the peaceful atom had not been fulfilled, the Commission under his leadership had become an effective government institution. Indeed, the future held great promise for the peaceful atom, but for the moment at least the military atom would continue to be in the ascendancy.
By mid July 1950 Gordon Dean had become chairman of the Commission, and the Nation was no longer in a twilight zone between peace and war. Following an attack by North Korean troops across the 38th parallel, President Truman ordered U.S. forces to the aid of South Korea. Suddenly increased military demands, added to the President's decision to develop the hydrogen bomb, threatened to exhaust the Commission's production capacity. Beginning in October 1950 the Commission embarked on a vast expansion program. During the next three years the constructicn of huge plants increased capacity at each step in the production chain. The new facilities included a feed materials production center at Fernald, Ohio; a plant to produce large quantities of lithium 6 at Oak Ridge; a gaseous-diffusion plant at Paducah, Kentucky; a whole new gaseous diffusion complex at Portsmouth, Ohio; two "Jumbo" reactors and a separation plant for producing plutonium at Hanford; and five heavy-water reactors at the Savannah River site in South Carolina for producing tritium from lithium 6 as well as plutonium. The three year three-billion-dollar expansion program represented one of the greatest federal construction projects in peacetime history.
In addition to having an impact on the Commission's expansion program, the Korean War also focused attention on the need for a continental test site. In December 1950, with the approval of the Department of Defense and the General Advisory Committee, the Commission selected the Las Vegas bombing and gunnery range as the site to conduct the January 1951 
Cooperation with Industry
The terms of the Atomic Energy Act enabled the Commission to encourage private industry to build its own nuclear plants, using fissionable material leased from the Government. Industry responded to the Commission's January 1855 Power Demonstration Reactor Program with four proposals covering all but one of the Commission's five prototypes. Thus by the end of 1857, the Commission had seven experimental reactors in operation and American industry was participating in nine independent or cooperative projects capable of producing almost 806,CKM kilowatts of electricity by the mid-1960's. For the moment at least, prospects for the future of the peaceful atom were extremely encouraging.fl7)
International Participation
In his Atoms-for-Peace proposal of December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower had proposed that the nuclear powers contribute portions of their stockpiles of normal uranium end fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency, which would then allocate these materials toward peaceful uses. After three years of patient diplomatic negotiations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formally inaugurated in Vienna, Austria on October 1, 1957. As head of the United States delegation to the first IAEA conference, Lewis Strauss delivered the President's message of hope that the fissioned atom would now be transformed from a symbol of fear to one of hope. 
Weapon Testing and Fallout
The detonation of the first shot in the Castle weapon test series in the spring of 1954, however, had threatened to cast a shadow over the glowing prospects for the peaceful atom, so recently kindled by Eisenhower's atomsfor-peace proposal. At the time of the Bravo shot on March 1, a Japanese fishing vessel had been within 82 nautical miles of the test area, close enough to receive a heavy dusting of radioactive fallout. By the time the ship, the f-ukuryu Maru (or Lucky Dragon) returned to Japan the effects of the radiation exposure had become evident, and several members of the crew required hospitalization. The American and Japanese press accounts of the incident had made the public aware, probably for the first time, of the worldwide dangers of radiation from fallout. (l9) On February 15, 1955, with the approval of the President, Strauss released a major report on the "Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Explosions."
The report did little to calm public apprehension, and mounting concerns found expression in numerous articles on radiation and fallout in scientific journals and other public media. Both the Committee on Armed Services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held healings in the spring of 1955 on problems associated with radioactive fallout. The following December, the United Nations established a Scientific Committee on Radiation with the former director of the, Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine, Shields Warren, as United States' representative. (20) 4 In January 1956 Commissioner Willard F. Libby revealed the existence of Project Sunshine, a study of global fallout from weapon testing which Libby had initiated in the fall of 1953 while serving on the General Advisory Committee. Commission laboratories and contractors had been analyzing data collected through a worldwide network monitoring the presence of strontium 90 in humans, foods and soils. Prior to 1953 public concern with radiation had focused primarily on workers in atomic energy projects. Although the Soviet Union tested a large number of high-yield weapons in the atmosphere during the autumn of 1961, President Kennedy limited the Commission's weapon laboratories to underground tests until April 25, 1962 , when the first shot in the Dominic series was conducted at Christmas Island in the Pacific. With technical support from Seaborg and the Commission, the President at the same time had been earnestly pursuing a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union. It had been a long and arduous task bearing little fruit. In an address to the Nation on March 2,1962, Kennedy had explained that he deplored the necessity of beginning atmospheric testing again, but "a nation which is refraining from tests obviously cannot match the gains of a nation conducting tests."031 Finally, after months of negotiations, a limited test ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, prohibiting nuclear explosion tests in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water, but permitting underground detonations provided no radioactive debris crossed the borders of the country in which the test was being conducted. 
Civilian Power: The Proliferation of the Peaceful Atom in the Sixties
The signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 also had an impact on the civilian power program. The cessation of weapon testing in the atmosphere gave new hope that the peaceful atom might soon command as large a share of the Commission's time and budget as the military atom had for so many years.
Although the imminence of economic nuclear power had been a main theme at the 1958 Geneva Conference, recurring technical difficulties in many of the prototype and demonstration plants in several European countries continued in the next few years to frustrate hopes for a practical new source of electrical power. In the United States, however, prospects were somewhat more encouraging.
In March 1962 President Kennedy had requested the Atomic Energy Commission to take a "new and hard look at the role of nuclear power" in the Nation's economy. In submitting the Commission's report several months later, Seaborg noted optimistically that the Commission's ten-year civilian power program, adopted in 1958, was on the threshold of attaining its primary objective of competitive nuclear power by 1968. Suggested goals for the future included a concentration of resources in the most promising reactor systems, the early establishment of a self-sufficient and growing nuclear power industry, and increased emphasis on the development of improved converter or breeder reactors which would conserve natural uranium resources. The report was broadly circulated and stimulated public confidence in the economic prospects for civilian nuclear power. (24) On November 22, 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson became President of the United States. One of Johnson's first and probably most significant acts was to order a 25 percent cutback in production of enriched uranium and the shut down of four plutonium piles, with the expectation that other nations might be challenged to do the same. Although verification was difficult, Chairman Khruschev later announced production cutbacks in the Soviet Union.
Another milestone in civilian power development occurred on December 12, 1963, when the Jersey Central Power and Light Company announced that it had contracted for a large nuclear power reactor to be built at Oyster Creek near Toms River, New Jersey. According to the company's own evaluation, the plant would be competitive with a fossil fuel plant. For the first time an American utility company had selected a nuclear power plant on purely economic grounds without government assistance and in direct competition with a fossil-fuel plant. 
Private Ownership Legislation
On August 26, 1964, President Johnson brought to an end an eighteen-year mandatory government monopoly of special nuclear materials by signing into law the "Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act." Enriched uranium for power reactor fuel would no longer have to be leased from the government. Private entities would be permitted to assume title to special nuclear materials. Although the new law provided for a transition period for the changeover from government to private ownership, after June 20, 1973 private ownership of power reactor fuels would become mandatory. The Act also authorized the Commission to offer uranium enriching services to both domestic and foreign customers under long-term contracts, beginning on January 1, 1969 
Nuclear Power Capacity
The Commission's 1962 report on civilian power had projected 5,060 megawatts of nuclear power capacity by 1970 and 40,ooO by 1980. Within five years the outlook had changed so dramatically that in March 1967 the Commission issued a supplementary report doubling its previous predictions. Within a few years, however, even these revised statistics were exceeded. (By the end of 1974 two hundred and thirty-three nuclear central-station generating units, with a capacity of 232,000 megawatts, were either in operation, under construction, or on order in the United States.11271
The Breeder Reactor
In addition to predicting dramatic increases in megawatt capacity, the Commission's 1967 report on civilian nuclear power reaffirmed the promise of the breeder reactor for meeting long-term energy needs, and gave the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) the highest priority for civilian reactor development. A major boost was given to the program four years later by President Richard Nixon. In his "clean energy" message to Congress on June 4, 1971, the President called for the commercial demonstration of a breeder reactor by 1980, stating that "The breeder reactor could extend the life of our natural uranium fuel supply from decades to centuries, with far less impact on the environment than the power plants which are operating today." (28) The fast breeder project included a demonstration plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee-the Clinch River Breeder 
Licensing and Regulation
Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress had given the Atomic Energy Commission the responsibility for regulating and licensing commercial atomic activities. As the Nation's electric power industry increasingly turned toward nuclear plants, the Commission found it necessary to modify its organizational structure to separate regulatory from non-regulatory functions. In 1961 the regulatory staff was separated from the General Manager's office and placed under a Director of Regulation who reported directly to the Commissioners. Two years later the regulatory and operational functions were separated physically when the regulatory staff was moved from the headquarters building in Germantown, Maryland to offices in BethesdaJ30)
Licensing procedures involved a series of technical reviews and public hearings, including an independent technical safety evaluation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Commission itself sewed as a final review board for all licenses granted, and maintained continuous surveillance of licensed reactors throughout their operating lifetime.
Research
The weapon requirements for national defense in the early years had forced the Commission to postpone goals for an all-out program of research on the peaceful atom. As seen in the development of the power reactor, however, there was a gradual shift in emphasis during the Eisenhower era, and the trend continued to gain momentum during the Kennedy and Johnson Years. In 1966 the AEC budget for the first time was divided about equally between weapons and peaceful uses. , Research and development programs in the 1966's and early 1970's produced a significant fund of knowledge about radiation and its effects, and provided basic data needed to determine radiation protection standards and to assess the environmental impact of nuclear technology. Advances in medical diagnostic techniques based on the use of radioisotopes and radiation machines added to the skills of the medical profession, while immunological research provided the knowledge needed for successful transplants. Other medical breakthroughs included the treatment of Parkinson's Disease, the preservation of cells for transfusion, and the introduction of small accelerators to produce short-lived radioisotopes for immediate use in patients. Although Oak Ridge produced virtually all of the radioisotopes available for physical and biomedical as well as for industrial applications, the Commission gradually Power (SNAP) program. Newly discovered heavy isotopes, such as Californium-252, were found useful in both research and industry. In addition, significant progress was made in developing cardiac pacemakers for human use and ultimately artificial hearts using radioisotopic-power sources. (32) Major research facilities such as high energy accelerators were constructed and operated by the AEC. Building on the accomplishments of the Berkeley Bevatron and the Brookhaven Cosmotron in the 1966's, the Commission supported even larger accelerators in the 1966's and 1976's, including the Alternating Gradient Syn-* chrotron at Brookhaven, the Zero Gradient Synchrotron at Argonne, and the two-mile long Stanford Linear Accelerator. The Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, completed in 1972, contained the world's most powerful proton synchrotron. The principal centers for research on controlled thermonuclear (fusion) reactors were Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, Livermore, and Princeton, although many universities and industrial facilities were involved on a smaller scale.
Applied Technology
As nuclear technology developed, the Commission perfected special applications of nuclear power, such as nuclear explosives for earth moving and for extracting resources deep undarground. Gnome, the first experiment in the PIowshare series, was conducted in December 1961 in a thick salt bed deposit near Carlsbad, New Mexico, while the firat nuclear cratering experiment, Project Sedan, was completed the following July at the Nevada Test Site. Project Gasbuggy in 1967 , Rulison in 1969 , and Rio Blanc0 in 1973 , tested methods for extracting natural gas from impermeable rock. In the early 1970's, the Commission directed applied technology projects toward environmental research, energy storage and transmission systems, synthetic fuels, and nonnuclear energy.
Nonnuclear Research
The scientific and technological expertise gained by the national laboratories in developing nuclear energy made the Commission a logical contender for a strong role in developing new energy options. The doors of the national labs first opened to nonnuclear research in 1960 when the Commission, in a special report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, acknowledged "that the strong capabilities of the laboratories are not the exclusive resources of the atomic energy field; they are held in trust for the Nation as a whole." Accordingly, work from other federal agencies would be accommodated whenever the skills of the national laboratories were needed.031
On August 11, 1971 , largely in response to President Nixon's energy message of june 4, Congress authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to undertake research and development projects geared to providing a variety of alternatives for meeting the Nation's energy needs. As a result the Commission's industrial contractors and national laboratories became involved in the areas of superconducting power transmission systems, energy storage, solar energy, geothermal resources, and coal gasification.04)
Reorganization
James R. Schlesinger took over the helm of the Atomic Energy Commission in August 1971, as its twenty-fifth year as an agency was drawing to a close. American troops were still in Vietnam and anti-war protests were widespread. The Nation faced increasing demands for energy, a leveling out of domestic oil production, limitations on coal use due to environmental concerns, inadequate natural gas supplies, and field delays in the licensing and construction of nuclear power plants. The rapid growth in atomic energy activities in the previous decade and changing perspectives in nuclear technology clearly pointed.to the need for a substantial reorganization of the Commission's operational and regulatory functions. For nearly a quarter of a century the Commission had focused research and development toward responding to national defense requirements, funding and developing new uses for atomic energy, and fostering the growth of a competitive and viable nuclear industry. The next few years would see increasing attacks on the Commission's role as a regulatory overseer of the nuclear industry, particularly in the areas of quality of product and public safety4351
As a first order of business, Schlesinger led the Commission in a comprehensive review of the agency's functions and organization.
An economist and former assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, Schlesinger announced the results of the review in December 1971. The first broad reorganizaton in ten years would bring together various related programs previously scattered throughout the agency. Developmental and operational functions formerly under the jurisdiction of the general manager would now bt under six assistant general managers for Energy and De\ slopment Programs, Researoh, Production and Management of Nuclear Materials, Environment and Safety Programs, National Security, and Administration. Reflecting expanding areas of Commission involvement were new divisions of Controlled Thermonuclear Research, International Security Affairs, and Applied Technology4361 The second half of 1971 also saw a major revamping of the regulatory organization and functions.
Calvert Cliffs Decision
The Nixon Administration believed that nuclear power, as an environmentally "clean" fuel, could help the Nation produce the increasing supply of energy needed for the future. On the other hand ponderous licensing proceduresand increasing environmental considerations lengthened the time necessary to bring nuclear power plants on line, and increased costs to the industry, and ultimately to the consumer. As Commissioner Doub informed the Atomic Industrial Forum in October 1971, the Commission harbored no illusions as to the magnitude of the task of trying to match "the capabilities of a dynamic and complex technology to the urgent energy and environmental needs of the countty."(37)
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in licensing procedures did not comply in several respects with the Act, and that the Commission should make an independent review and evaluation of all environmental effects at every decision point in the nuclear power plant licensing process.
Moving swiftly to implement the Court's ruling, the Commission made substantive changes in environmental review procedures. Both the Commission and the license applicant would now be required to consider the total impact of the proposed plant on the environment, including water quality. In addition, a cost-benefit analysis would balance the benefits of building the facility against a variety of alternatives.(38) These changes in procedures affected virtually all nuclear power plants whether licensed for operation or under review.
To expedite the additional procedures which the Calvert Cliff's decision required, Schlesinger made significant changes in the Commission's regulatory organization, and added additional personnel to the staff to help with the expanded reactor licensing workload. Additional changes in 1972 further streamlined the regulatory staff. Three directors consolidated the functions previously performed by seven divisions. All licensing activities were centered in the largest of the three, of Qdstence. After concentrating on defense comtween January 27,1972 and July 28,1973 , had produced a mibnents in the early years, the Commission then focused voluminous transcript, a clear witness to the complexity of on the development of a viable nuclear industry, only to the technical issues involved in nuclear safety. A constant come under fire in the late 1960's and 1970's for being in advocate of the public's right to know and fully understand the possible dangers of radiation, the Joint Committee on the position of regulating the same industry it helped to m Atomic Energy had also held a hearing in early 1973 on the safety of nuclear power plants.
7Itis difficulty had been foreseen in 1981 when the functims of the agency were divided between the General Clearly the handwriting on the wall was spelling out the numbered days of the AEC in 1973. Although nuclear Manager and the Director of Regulation. Then in 1983 the two functions were physically separated by being housed power constituted a significant part of the answer to the Nation's need for additional sources of energy, it was by in different geographical locations. Finally, the legal separation of the developmental and regulatory functions, no means the only answer as had been predicted in the early decades of the Commission's existence. Regulatory restrictions and environmental concerns were a large part of the reason for the demise of the AEC, but In the preceding twenty-eight years the Atomic Energy mole important was the recognition that a single Commission had accomplished a large portion of the mistedmology should not be the exclusive focus of one agension established by the Congress in 1948. First, through its cy. The energy crisis would now require the coordination weapon laboratories and production contractors, it had of all major energy programs in a new' research and developed and stockpiled an array of sophisticated nuclear development agency, whose primary purpose would be to weapons which for nearly three decades had served as an assist the Nation in achieving energy independence. important element in national defense. Also in the area of defense, the Commission had supported the development As a legacy to the new agency, the Atomic Energy Comof nuclear propulsion reactors which made possible the mission passed on its unique production facilities, its creation of a fleet of reliable nuclear submarines and sur- 
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